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This	  article	  explores	  possible	  connections	  between	  language,	  music	  and	  creativity,	  
particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  change	  in	  linguistic	  and	  musical	  grammars.	  It	  considers	  parallels	  
between	  properties	  of	  usage-­‐based	  grammars	  (like	  chunking	  and	  schematicity)	  and	  musical	  
structures.	  While	  some	  research	  into	  the	  relationship	  between	  music	  and	  language	  has	  
tended	  to	  align	  itself	  more	  with	  formal	  approaches	  to	  knowledge	  about	  language,	  the	  
discussion	  here	  is	  more	  focussed	  on	  functional,	  usage-­‐based	  approaches.	  The	  article	  sets	  
out	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  work	  on	  musical	  change	  might	  be	  used	  to	  think	  about	  parallels	  
between	  language	  and	  music,	  and	  how	  this	  connects	  to	  creativity.	  	  
	  
	  
1	   Introduction	  
This	  short	  article	  provides	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  potential	  avenues	  for	  research	  in	  
connecting	  language,	  music	  and	  creativity,	  particularly	  as	  this	  relates	  to	  change	  in	  linguistic	  
and	  musical	  grammars.1	  It	  explores	  parallels	  between	  properties	  of	  usage-­‐based	  grammars	  
(like	  chunking	  and	  schematicity)	  and	  musical	  structures.	  Some	  research	  in	  the	  relationship	  
between	  music	  and	  language	  has	  tended	  to	  align	  itself	  more	  with	  formal	  approaches	  to	  
musical	  and	  linguistic	  grammars	  (Jackendoff	  and	  Lerdahl	  1995,	  2006;	  Rohrmeier	  2011).	  The	  
discussion	  here	  is	  more	  focussed	  on	  functional,	  usage-­‐based	  approaches.	  This	  is	  largely	  
because	  of	  the	  emphasis	  on	  change.	  In	  work	  on	  language	  change,	  it	  is	  regularly	  
acknowledged,	  based	  on	  research	  in	  both	  sociolinguistics	  and	  historical	  linguistics,	  that	  
systemic	  changes	  emerge	  from	  instances	  of	  language	  use.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  position	  that	  
unites	  many	  if	  not	  all	  linguistic	  theories:	  they	  differ	  in	  (a)	  how	  much	  of	  the	  system	  is	  
amenable	  to	  change;	  (b)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  acquisition	  is	  restricted	  to	  a	  particular	  period	  in	  
the	  lifespan;	  and	  (c)	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  usage	  features	  (such	  as	  frequency).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  editors	  and	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  for	  their	  comments	  on	  an	  
earlier	  version	  of	  this	  article.	  All	  shortcomings	  are	  my	  own.	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2	   On	  being	  novel	  in	  language	  and	  music	  
By	  way	  of	  introduction,	  let	  us	  begin	  with	  some	  relatively	  simple	  cases	  of	  language	  change,	  in	  
which	  new	  words	  are	  created.	  For	  lexical	  creativity	  in	  a	  network	  of	  speakers,	  we	  can	  
distinguish	  the	  creation	  of	  (a)	  a	  new	  lexical	  process	  (a	  new	  means	  of	  forming	  lexemes)	  and	  
(b)	  new	  instances	  of	  existing	  processes.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  below	  in	  section	  3,	  but	  for	  now,	  
simply	  recognise	  this	  distinction.	  Thus,	  the	  process	  of	  acronymy	  (as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  
English	  words	  NATO	  and	  laser)	  appears	  to	  be	  relatively	  recent	  (i.e.	  a	  late	  Modern	  English	  
phenomenon),	  while	  blending	  (as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  English	  words	  bromance	  and	  
manscape)	  is	  a	  lexical	  process	  which	  emerged	  much	  earlier,	  in	  the	  Middle	  English	  period	  
(see	  e.g.	  Smith	  2014).	  Once	  a	  process	  is	  conventionalised,	  new	  instances	  come	  into	  being	  at	  
different	  stages	  (e.g.	  motel	  appears	  to	  antedate	  spork).	  Each	  of	  these	  creations	  involves	  an	  
individual’s	  innovation	  becoming	  conventionalised	  and	  recognised	  as	  a	  word	  belonging	  to	  at	  
least	  one	  variety	  of	  English.	  
	   As	  is	  well	  known,	  some	  types	  of	  lexical	  creativity	  involve	  new	  uses	  of	  existing	  words.	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  Shakespeare’s	  use	  of	  incarnadine	  as	  a	  verb	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  
	  
	   Will	  all	  great	  Neptune’s	  ocean	  wash	  this	  blood	  
	   Clean	  from	  my	  hand?	  No;	  this	  my	  hand	  will	  rather	  
	   The	  multitudinous	  seas	  incarnadine,	  
	   Making	  the	  green	  one	  red.	  
	   	   	   	   	   (Shakespeare,	  Macbeth,	  2.2.57-­‐60)	  
	  
The	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  Latinate	  (multitudinous,	  incarnadine)	  and	  Germanic	  (make,	  green,	  
one,	  red)	  lexis	  across	  lines,	  coupled	  with	  the	  syntactic	  ambiguity	  of	  one	  (as	  head	  of	  the	  NP	  
the	  green	  one	  meaning	  ‘sea’	  or	  as	  modifier	  in	  the	  AP	  one	  red	  ‘entirely	  red’)	  offers	  the	  hearer	  
an	  ambiguity,	  the	  resolution	  of	  either	  of	  which	  foregrounds	  the	  monstrosity	  of	  Macbeth’s	  
act	  (see	  the	  discussion	  in	  Ronberg	  1992,	  19-­‐20	  and	  Blank	  2002,	  116).	  Here	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  
of	  conscious	  or	  agentive	  linguistic	  creativity	  in	  a	  literary	  text	  where	  innovation	  exists,	  at	  
least	  in	  part,	  ‘for	  art’s	  sake’.	  	  
But	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  lexical	  creativity	  is	  agentive	  is	  less	  clear-­‐cut.	  
For	  instance,	  Old	  English	  kennings	  involve	  metaphorical	  associations	  that	  may	  have	  
particular	  stylistic	  effects	  akin	  to	  those	  in	  the	  Macbeth	  quotation	  above	  (see	  e.g.	  Scragg	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2013,	  60-­‐1	  on	  the	  use	  of	  sincgyfan	  ‘giver	  of	  treasure’	  to	  describe	  Hrothgar	  in	  Beowulf	  (line	  
1012)).	  Yet	  over	  time,	  such	  compounds	  may	  lexicalize	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  lose	  both	  
metaphoricity	  and	  compositionality:	  examples	  include	  lord	  <	  OE	  hlaf	  weard,	  literally	  ‘loaf	  
guardian’	  or	  daisy	  <	  OE	  daeges	  eage	  ‘day’s	  eye’.	  Thus	  erstwhile	  artistic	  or	  creative	  
expressions	  may	  	  become	  commonplace,	  losing	  figurativeness	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  compound	  
to	  monomorpheme.	  While	  the	  development	  of	  the	  monomorphemic	  forms	  must	  involve	  
novelty	  (there	  is	  something	  new	  and	  conventional	  for	  the	  network	  of	  speakers	  of	  that	  
variety),	  the	  loss	  of	  substance,	  both	  phonetic	  and	  semantic,	  is	  hardly	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  conscious	  
act	  of	  creation,	  and	  therefore	  not	  agentive.	  	  
So	  in	  the	  case	  of	  lexical	  innovation	  and	  change,	  novelty	  –	  whether	  that	  be	  a	  new	  
process,	  new	  instances	  of	  a	  process	  or	  simple	  neologism	  –	  may	  be	  conscious	  and	  may	  be	  
subconscious,	  but	  more	  crucially	  for	  the	  discussion	  below,	  subconscious	  changes	  may	  affect	  
items	  that	  have	  been	  created	  consciously.	  How	  does	  this	  relate	  to	  musical	  creativity?	  Let	  us	  
begin	  by	  thinking	  about	  Western	  art	  music.2	  An	  interesting	  question	  that	  arises	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  musical	  creativity	  is	  where	  the	  locus	  of	  creation	  lies,	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  indeed	  one	  
locus.	  Imagine	  you	  are	  attending	  a	  live	  performance	  of	  Beethoven’s	  fifth	  symphony:	  to	  what	  
extent	  are	  you	  witnessing	  a	  creative	  act	  at	  that	  event?	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  musical	  creativity	  
(at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  Western	  art	  music	  is	  concerned)	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  “activity	  
bounded	  by	  the	  artefact	  of	  the	  musical	  work	  and	  by	  the	  persona	  of	  the	  composer”	  (Impett	  
2009,	  403),	  then	  the	  composition	  of	  that	  piece	  by	  Beethoven	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century	  was	  a	  creative	  act.	  Yet	  it	  is	  clearly	  the	  case	  that	  no	  two	  performances	  of	  
the	  piece	  are	  the	  same;	  each	  performance	  involves	  a	  creation	  of	  an	  abstract	  schema	  that	  is	  
represented	  by	  the	  score,	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  considered	  novel.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  
we	  really	  want	  to	  equate	  novelty	  with	  creativity.	  
	  
3	   Creativity	  and	  agency	  in	  language	  and	  music	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Impett	  (2009,	  403)	  writes:	  “Taking	  Western	  masterworks	  as	  our	  sole	  evidence	  might	  be	  
equivalent	  to	  understanding	  architecture	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  pyramids;	  objects	  of	  
wonder	  but	  perhaps	  eccentric	  to	  any	  general	  case	  of	  human	  behaviour”.	  One	  might	  say	  the	  
same	  about	  drawing	  linguistic	  examples	  from	  the	  English	  literary	  canon:	  we	  recognise	  the	  
creativity	  involved,	  but	  we	  equally	  recognise	  the	  atypical	  discourse	  context	  and	  text	  type,	  
given	  ordinary	  human	  interaction.	  
	   4	  
	   In	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  link	  between	  novelty	  and	  creativity	  further,	  I	  make	  a	  
distinction	  between	  conventional	  creativity	  and	  non-­‐conventional	  creativity.	  In	  some	  ways	  
this	  connects	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  F-­‐	  and	  E-­‐creativity	  made	  by	  Sampson	  (2016),	  as	  
discussed	  by	  Hoffmann	  (this	  volume).	  In	  language,	  conventional	  creativity	  captures	  the	  
uniqueness	  of	  every	  linguistic	  act	  –	  the	  existing	  conventions	  of	  the	  language	  are	  used,	  but	  
their	  combination	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  particular	  context	  in	  which	  the	  communicative	  act	  takes	  
place.	  Non-­‐conventional	  creativity	  captures	  innovations	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  language	  change	  
–	  the	  language	  user	  produces	  or	  perceives	  an	  utterance	  which	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  
conventions	  of	  the	  speech	  community,	  via	  some	  alteration	  to	  form,	  meaning,	  or	  the	  
symbolic	  relation	  between	  the	  two.	  The	  situation	  in	  music	  is	  rather	  more	  complex.	  As	  in	  
language,	  different	  musical	  varieties	  have	  different	  conventions	  (thirty-­‐two	  bar	  form	  is	  
different	  from	  sonata	  form,	  for	  instance),	  but	  it	  is	  clearly	  possible	  to	  be	  creative	  within	  the	  
conventions	  of	  a	  particular	  form:	  both	  Mozart’s	  twenty-­‐fifth	  and	  his	  fortieth	  symphony	  are	  
written	  in	  G	  minor,	  and	  the	  first	  movement	  of	  each	  is	  written	  in	  sonata	  form,	  yet	  both	  are	  
clearly	  unique	  creative	  compositions.	  Mahler’s	  third	  symphony	  in	  D	  minor	  is	  also	  arguably	  
written	  in	  sonata	  form,	  but	  much	  less	  conventionally	  so,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one	  might	  
consider	  it	  to	  be	  so	  extreme	  an	  ‘outlier’	  that	  it	  does	  not	  sit	  comfortably	  within	  the	  category.	  
With	  non-­‐conventional	  creativity	  in	  music,	  the	  situation	  is	  again	  complex.	  Fundamental	  
restructuring	  of	  musical	  architecture	  clearly	  counts	  as	  non-­‐conventional	  creativity,	  as	  was	  
the	  case	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  tonal	  to	  atonal	  organization	  in	  early	  twentieth	  century	  western	  art	  
music.	  Less	  clear	  cut	  are	  cases	  like	  the	  opening	  chord	  in	  Beethoven’s	  first	  symphony,	  where	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  Bb	  in	  a	  “C	  major”	  chord	  begins	  a	  sequence	  of	  perfect	  cadences	  in	  the	  
introduction,	  a	  harmonic	  progression	  which	  only	  clearly	  resolves	  into	  the	  tonic	  key	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  exposition.	  While	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  movement	  in	  canonical	  sonata	  form,	  the	  
rather	  atypical	  opening	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  non-­‐conventional	  creativity.	  	  
	   As	  noted	  in	  footnote	  1,	  it	  is	  dangerous	  to	  theorise	  about	  music	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
its	  manifestation	  in	  the	  western	  art	  tradition.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  we	  might	  then	  look	  instead	  
at	  comparing	  creativity	  in	  everyday	  linguistic	  interaction	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  musical	  
improvisation	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  the	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  
conscious	  creativity	  do	  not	  disappear.	  	  Speakers	  still	  create	  new	  processes	  as	  well	  as	  new	  
instances	  of	  processes	  as	  part	  of	  everyday	  interaction:	  most	  language	  change	  is	  not	  a	  result	  
of	  conscious	  decision-­‐making	  on	  the	  part	  of	  speakers	  and	  hearers.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	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that	  the	  language	  users	  are	  not	  being	  creative.	  Conversely,	  the	  ‘freedom’	  sometimes	  
wrongly	  associated	  with	  improvised	  music	  belies	  the	  frequent	  adherence	  to	  structural	  
schemas	  for	  different	  genres.	  
We	  might	  therefore	  make	  a	  further	  distinction	  between	  agentive	  creativity	  and	  non-­‐
agentive	  creativity.	  Agentive	  creativity	  involves	  a	  conscious	  attempt	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
individual	  to	  be	  novel,	  expressive	  and	  noticeable.	  In	  language,	  this	  has	  sometimes	  been	  said	  
to	  lead	  to	  language	  change,3	  and	  on	  one	  level	  this	  is	  clearly	  the	  case,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  
discussion	  of	  lexical	  creativity	  above.	  More	  murky	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  conscious	  we	  are	  
when	  we	  invite	  particular	  inferences	  in	  interaction,	  whereby	  the	  acceptance	  of	  such	  
inferences	  may	  lead	  to	  both	  semantic	  and	  syntactic	  change,	  in	  processes	  of	  
grammaticalization	  (Traugott	  and	  Dasher	  2002).	  In	  music,	  agentive	  creativity	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  composer,	  less	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  performer	  and	  least	  clear	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  audience.	  Consider	  again	  the	  example	  of	  a	  contemporary	  performance	  of	  Beethoven’s	  
fifth	  symphony	  alluded	  to	  in	  section	  2.	  Here	  we	  have	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  
performance	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  by	  a	  group	  of	  people	  that	  excludes	  the	  composer.	  For	  every	  
member	  of	  that	  orchestra,	  it	  is	  obviously	  true	  that	  no	  two	  performances	  of	  Beethoven’s	  fifth	  
are	  identical,	  and	  therefore	  each	  performance	  is	  a	  new	  creation	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  blueprint	  
created	  by	  Beethoven.	  Similarly,	  for	  the	  audience,	  each	  exposure	  to	  the	  music	  involves	  
exposure	  to	  something	  that	  has	  been	  newly	  created	  for	  that	  performance	  or	  recording.	  
There	  are	  clear	  parallels	  with	  language:	  each	  time	  a	  hearer	  hears	  an	  utterance,	  they	  are	  
experiencing	  something	  novel,	  because	  the	  utterance	  is	  bound	  to	  a	  particular	  context.	  In	  
usage-­‐based	  frameworks	  each	  token	  of	  use	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  shape	  structure	  (thus	  an	  
utterance	  may	  serve	  to	  entrench	  constructional	  representations	  of	  various	  kinds).	  The	  next	  
section	  explores	  how	  principles	  of	  usage-­‐based	  linguistics	  may	  also	  explain	  patterns	  of	  
creativity	  in	  music.	  
	  
4	   Cognitive	  activity:	  categorization	  and	  schematization	  
Zbikowski	  (2006,	  116)	  argues	  that	  “musical	  understanding	  involves	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  
occupy	  the	  conceptual	  level,	  which	  I	  take	  to	  be	  a	  level	  of	  cognitive	  activity	  at	  least	  
potentially	  accessible	  to	  conscious	  thought.”	  This	  raises	  the	  important	  question	  of	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Haspelmath	  (1999)	  on	  extravagance	  and	  grammaticalization.	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might	  be	  meant	  by	  musical	  understanding.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  understanding	  is	  a	  synonym	  of	  
knowledge,	  so	  let	  us	  consider	  in	  that	  regard	  what	  a	  baby	  knows	  about	  lullabies.	  Specifically,	  
to	  what	  extent	  does	  a	  child	  have	  to	  have	  ‘musical	  understanding’	  for	  a	  particular	  cognitive	  
process	  to	  be	  invoked	  at	  the	  conceptual	  level	  when	  experiencing	  a	  lullaby?	  Presumably	  the	  
child	  has	  some	  sort	  of	  cognitive	  response	  to	  it,	  without	  necessarily	  ‘understanding’	  anything	  
by	  it,	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  musical	  structure.	  Rather,	  the	  child	  responds	  to	  an	  auditory	  event	  
associated	  with	  a	  particular	  context	  and	  type	  of	  interaction	  (e.g.	  with	  the	  parent	  or	  
guardian)	  in	  a	  particular	  context	  and	  location	  (in	  a	  cot	  at	  night).	  Yet	  this	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  
situation	  in	  which	  certain	  ‘types’	  of	  music	  come	  to	  be	  categorized	  by	  the	  child,	  and	  a	  more	  
general	  schema	  of	  ‘lullaby’	  is	  created	  (even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  labelled	  as	  such)	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
exposure	  over	  usage	  events.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  briefly	  consider	  musical	  categorization	  and	  
schematization	  in	  more	  detail,	  relating	  them	  where	  possible	  to	  what	  we	  know	  about	  
linguistic	  categories	  and	  schemas.	  
	  
4.1	   	  Categorization	  
Zbikowski	  (2006,	  117)	  develops	  his	  argument	  regarding	  musical	  understanding	  as	  follows,	  
suggesting	  two	  particular	  issues	  of	  relevance:	  “the	  comprehension	  of	  a	  series	  of	  temporally	  
successive	  events,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  draw	  connections	  between	  such	  events	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
shared	  features.”	  This	  is	  clearly	  related	  to	  a	  usage-­‐based	  perspective	  on	  developing	  a	  
knowledge	  of	  language:	  the	  speech	  signal	  involves	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  which	  we	  
understand	  as	  connected,	  and	  as	  having	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  properties.	  It	  is	  also	  relatable	  to	  
language	  change,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  signal	  involves	  a	  parsable	  formal	  
sequence,	  but	  where	  that	  sequence	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  novel	  meaning.	  Reanalysis	  
essentially	  involves	  a	  speaker/hearer	  ‘chopping	  up’	  the	  signal	  in	  a	  novel	  way,	  which	  may	  
give	  rise	  to	  new	  linguistic	  constructions,	  as	  form-­‐meaning	  pairings.	  	  
Zbinkowski	  (2006)	  also	  talks	  about	  chunks,	  and	  patterns	  of	  repetition	  in	  music.	  This	  is	  
manifest	  in	  the	  case	  of	  musical	  motifs,	  as	  in	  the	  reuse	  of	  the	  ‘fate’	  motif	  from	  the	  first	  
movement	  of	  Tchaikovsky’s	  fourth	  symphony	  in	  the	  final	  movement	  of	  that	  piece:	  there	  is	  
an	  aesthetic	  effect	  of	  having	  something	  from	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  work	  being	  repeated	  
unexpectedly	  in	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  symphony.	  Zbikowski’s	  analysis	  associates	  musical	  
chunks	  with	  cognitive	  basic	  level	  categories.	  This	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  chunk-­‐like	  motifs	  
in	  the	  first	  movement	  of	  Brahms’	  second	  symphony:	  for	  instance,	  the	  D-­‐C#-­‐D	  sequence	  in	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bar	  1	  in	  the	  cellos	  is	  essentially	  a	  formula	  of	  the	  entire	  symphony	  (repeated,	  for	  example,	  
albeit	  with	  a	  different	  rhythm,	  by	  the	  violins	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  final	  movement).	  In	  
Zbikowski’s	  words,	  “[a]ttending	  to	  these	  chunks,	  we	  are	  occupied	  not	  with	  individual	  notes	  
or	  with	  four-­‐	  or	  eight-­‐measure	  phrases,	  but	  with	  a	  level	  somewhere	  in	  between”	  (Zbikowski	  
2006,	  119).	  If	  we	  see	  chunks	  as	  basic-­‐level	  musical	  categories,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  other	  chunks	  
in	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  whose	  structure	  is	  similar	  in	  certain	  ways	  and	  different	  in	  others,	  and	  
which	  help	  to	  structure	  the	  work	  as	  a	  whole.	  So,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  first	  movement	  of	  the	  
Brahms	  symphony	  discussed	  above,	  the	  exposition	  continues	  (after	  the	  cello	  notes	  in	  bar	  1)	  
with	  a	  three	  note	  arpeggiated	  sequence	  from	  the	  horns	  (bars	  2-­‐3)	  and	  then	  a	  three	  note	  
ascending	  scale	  in	  the	  woodwind	  (bar	  6).	  These	  other	  two	  sequences	  are	  easily	  and	  
frequently	  found	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  symphony	  –	  thus	  we	  have	  three	  three-­‐note	  sequences	  
which	  form	  the	  ‘basic	  level’	  categories	  of	  the	  symphonic	  arrangement.	  This	  ties	  in	  with	  the	  
second	  observation	  Zbikowski	  makes,	  about	  drawing	  connections.	  The	  connections	  are	  that	  
there	  are	  three	  note	  sequences,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  canonical	  in	  western	  art	  music	  of	  the	  time:	  
a	  sequence	  involving	  an	  alternation	  of	  the	  smallest	  unit	  (the	  semitone),	  a	  sequence	  
involving	  the	  tonic	  chord	  triad,	  and	  a	  sequence	  involving	  three	  notes	  of	  a	  scale.	  	  
	  
4.2	   Schematization	  
To	  illustrate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  schematization	  is	  relevant	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  parallels	  
between	  linguistic	  and	  musical	  structures,	  I	  begin	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  
sonata	  form,	  and	  relate	  this	  to	  issues	  of	  E-­‐	  and	  F-­‐creativity	  (Hoffmann,	  this	  volume).	  In	  their	  
discussion	  of	  sonata	  form	  as	  a	  significant	  structuring	  device	  in	  western	  art	  music	  in	  the	  
classical	  and	  romantic	  periods,	  Hepokoski	  and	  Darcy	  (2006,	  15-­‐6;	  original	  emphasis)	  make	  
interesting	  observations	  that	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  essentially	  constituted	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  chunks	  
discussed	  in	  §4.1:	  “in	  the	  hands	  of	  most	  composers,	  constructing	  a	  sonata-­‐form	  movement	  
was	  a	  task	  of	  modular	  assembly:	  the	  forging	  of	  a	  succession	  of	  short,	  section-­‐specific	  musical	  
units	  (spaces	  of	  action)	  linked	  together	  into	  an	  ongoing	  linear	  chain—pressing	  down	  and	  
connecting	  one	  appropriately	  stylized	  musical	  tile	  after	  another.”	  But	  this	  modular	  assembly	  
has	  to	  involve	  schemas	  of	  various	  kinds,	  generalisations	  across	  particular	  instances	  which	  
give	  the	  musical	  structure	  its	  recognizable	  shape.	  	  
Furthermore,	  sonata	  form	  structure	  involves	  various	  sub-­‐schemas,	  each	  with	  their	  
distinctive	  properties.	  For	  instance,	  some	  instances	  of	  sonata	  form	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  having	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a	  monothematic	  exposition,	  in	  which	  the	  second	  theme	  is	  essentially	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  
the	  first	  theme,	  rather	  than	  a	  totally	  different	  structure:	  an	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  finale	  of	  
Haydn’s	  string	  quartet	  in	  C	  major,	  opus	  74/1.	  In	  many	  other	  cases,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  second	  
theme	  does	  not	  resemble	  the	  first	  at	  all	  (as	  in	  the	  first	  movement	  of	  Mozart’s	  forty-­‐first	  
symphony,	  K551,	  ‘Jupiter’).	  Such	  organization	  is	  paralleled	  in	  constructional	  (and	  other	  
cognitive)	  approaches	  to	  language,	  in	  which	  generalisations	  such	  as	  the	  Ditransitive	  
Construction	  are	  underspecified	  in	  both	  form	  and	  meaning,	  while	  less	  schematic	  instances	  
(such	  as	  the	  deny-­‐transfer	  subschema)	  sanction	  a	  fewer	  range	  of	  verbs	  and	  have	  a	  more	  
restricted/semantically	  specified	  meaning.	  	  
This	  also	  connects	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  productivity	  –	  highly	  schematic	  structures	  (such	  
as	  sonata	  form	  or	  32	  bar	  form)	  have	  the	  power	  to	  generate	  a	  great	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  
that	  type.	  Creativity	  of	  this	  kind	  may	  be	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  F-­‐creativity	  (many	  mid-­‐
twentieth	  century	  rock	  songs	  follow	  a	  32	  bar	  form	  structure,	  for	  example),	  though	  E-­‐
creativity	  is	  also	  possible;	  however,	  instances	  which	  are	  E-­‐creative	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  weakening	  
of	  the	  productive	  power	  of	  the	  original	  schema	  as	  an	  alternative	  version	  may	  develop	  (e.g.	  
the	  verse-­‐chorus	  structure	  of	  many	  rock	  songs	  of	  the	  late	  twentieth	  and	  contemporary	  
periods,	  which	  became	  more	  productive	  than	  32	  bar	  form).	  
	  
5	   Conclusion	  
The	  discussion	  here	  has	  simply	  scratched	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  somewhat	  under-­‐researched	  topic	  
of	  functional	  musical	  grammar	  (as	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  much	  of	  the	  work	  on	  the	  
relationship	  between	  language	  and	  music	  has	  taken	  an	  approach	  more	  closely	  allied	  with	  
formal	  linguistics	  e.g.	  Jackendoff	  and	  Lerdahl	  1995,	  Rohrmeier	  2011]).	  Many	  interesting	  
issues	  have	  not	  been	  addressed	  at	  all.	  For	  instance,	  one	  avenue	  for	  future	  study	  concerns	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  musical	  schemas	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  constraints	  on	  well-­‐formed	  musical	  
structures,	  and	  E-­‐creativity	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  constraint	  violation,	  which	  may	  in	  time	  become	  
conventional	  as	  the	  musical	  grammar	  changes.	  Given	  what	  has	  been	  considered,	  
nevertheless,	  the	  following	  issues	  have	  emerged	  as	  central	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  creativity	  
parallels	  between	  music	  and	  language:	  
	  
1.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  E-­‐	  and	  F-­‐creativity	  in	  music,	  and	  how	  this	  parallels	  
sanction	  and	  extension	  in	  linguistic	  schemas.	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2.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  E-­‐creativity	  involves	  non-­‐conventional	  creativity	  which,	  once	  more	  
widely	  adopted	  as	  a	  model,	  becomes	  conventional	  and	  more	  productive	  (i.e.	  becomes	  F-­‐	  
creative),	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  many	  innovations	  in	  language	  become	  conventionalised	  as	  
part	  of	  a	  grammatical	  system	  and	  increase	  in	  productivity.	  
	  
3.	  The	  mental	  representation	  of	  musical	  chunks	  and	  their	  role	  in	  musical	  creativity,	  along	  
with	  parallels	  in	  linguistic	  chunking.	  As	  (for	  example)	  Taylor	  (2002)	  has	  observed,	  the	  
diversity	  of	  linguistic	  chunking	  is	  vast,	  ranging	  from	  proverbs	  (e.g.	  too	  many	  cooks	  spoil	  the	  
broth)	  and	  quotations	  (e.g.	  all’s	  well	  that	  ends	  well)	  through	  to	  fixed	  and	  schematic	  idioms	  
(e.g.	  that’s	  torn	  it	  and	  [Nth	  cousin,	  X	  times	  removed],	  respectively).	  Some	  of	  these	  patterns	  
allow	  formal	  variation	  (e.g.	  not	  the	  {brightest	  bulb	  in	  the	  pack/sharpest	  knife	  in	  the	  
drawer/quickest	  bunny	  in	  the	  forest},	  all	  of	  which	  mean	  ‘not	  intelligent’).	  Similarly	  in	  music,	  
some	  material	  from	  one	  composer	  is	  quoted	  directly	  by	  another	  (e.g.	  Rouget	  De	  Lisle’s	  tune	  
which	  became	  the	  French	  national	  anthem	  quoted	  by	  Tchaikovsky	  in	  his	  1812	  Overture),	  or	  
repurposed	  (e.g.	  the	  opening	  of	  Beethoven’s	  fifth	  symphony	  as	  a	  motif	  for	  victory).	  Musical	  
chunking	  may	  also	  occur	  at	  a	  more	  schematic	  level	  (for	  example,	  the	  I-­‐V-­‐vi-­‐IV	  chord	  
progression	  found	  in	  many	  pop	  songs,	  from	  The	  Beatles’	  Let	  It	  Be	  to	  Men	  at	  Work’s	  Down	  
Under).4	  
	  
One	  brief	  caveat	  in	  relation	  to	  F-­‐	  and	  E-­‐creativity	  seems	  to	  be	  necessary.	  There	  is	  risk	  in	  
focusing	  on	  F-­‐creativity	  because	  that	  notion	  of	  creativity	  (at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  language	  is	  
concerned)	  may	  become	  so	  broad	  that	  it	  is	  redundant.	  Essentially,	  F-­‐creativity	  may	  logically	  
be	  associated	  with	  all	  aspects	  of	  production	  and	  perception,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  music	  and	  
language.	  While	  this	  may	  well	  be	  true,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  just	  too	  broad	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  
understanding	  the	  nature	  of	  change	  in	  music	  and	  language.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  might	  be	  
the	  idea	  that	  we	  typically	  see	  musical	  and	  literary	  ‘creations’	  as	  being	  the	  consequence	  of	  
genuine	  endeavour	  –	  that	  an	  artist	  has	  struggled	  to	  create	  a	  piece	  of	  work.	  But	  linguists	  
would	  consider	  it	  absurd	  to	  think	  that	  the	  language	  of	  a	  novel	  in	  the	  English	  canon	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Indeed	  the	  order	  I-­‐V-­‐vi-­‐IV	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  variants	  of	  the	  four	  chords:	  other	  variants	  
like	  vi-­‐IV-­‐I-­‐V	  are	  also	  popular	  (found	  in	  Luis	  Fonsi’s	  Despacito,	  Bon	  Jovi’s	  It’s	  My	  Life	  and	  Lady	  
Gaga’s	  Poker	  Face,	  among	  others).	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especially	  ‘typical’	  of	  language;	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  a	  Beethoven	  string	  quartet	  is	  not	  ‘typical’	  
music.	  Thinking	  more	  naturalistically,	  linguists	  are	  often	  interested	  more	  in	  what	  speakers	  
do	  in	  ordinary	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  interactions;	  the	  musical	  parallel	  is	  probably	  something	  like	  
whistling	  as	  you	  walk	  down	  the	  street	  (although	  this	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  communal	  and	  
interactive	  in	  the	  way	  that	  language	  typically	  is).	  While	  Western	  art	  music	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  
rich	  source	  of	  data	  to	  track	  change	  over	  time,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  important	  to	  underline	  once	  
more	  its	  atypicality	  in	  relation	  to	  musical	  traditions	  in	  other	  cultures.	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